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Limitless capacity: a dynamic
object-oriented approach to
short-term memory
Bill Macken*, John Taylor and Dylan Jones
School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
The notion of capacity-limited processing systems is a core element of cognitive
accounts of limited and variable performance, enshrined within the short-term memory
construct. We begin with a detailed critical analysis of the conceptual bases of this view
and argue that there are fundamental problems – ones that go to the heart of cognitivism
more generally – that render it untenable. In place of limited capacity systems, we
propose a framework for explaining performance that focuses on the dynamic interplay
of three aspects of any given setting: the particular task that must be accomplished,
the nature and form of the material upon which the task must be performed, and the
repertoire of skills and perceptual-motor functions possessed by the participant. We
provide empirical examples of the applications of this framework in areas of performance
typically accounted for by reference to capacity-limited short-term memory processes.
Keywords: short-term memory, limited capacity, perceptual-motor processing, perceptual organization, lan-
guage and memory
It is paradigmatic in cognitive psychology to attribute performance limitations, in the ﬁnal
instance, to the limited capacity of the processing systems that underpin that performance. This
is particularly the case in short-term memory, a 60-years old paradigm in which the profound dif-
ference between these two concepts – contextually limited performance and structurally limited
processing capacity – is not often confronted or even acknowledged. Indeed, the idea of a limited-
capacity, short-term memory system appears as an integral part in explanations of aspects of
cognition as broad and diverse as the development and evolution of language (e.g., Baddeley et al.,
1998; Wray, 2000), individual diﬀerences in intelligence (Hornung et al., 2011), distraction from
task-irrelevant material (e.g., Lavie, 2005), mental arithmetic (e.g., Lee and Kang, 2002) and logical
reasoning (e.g., Gilhooly, 2004). So embedded is this explanatory device that limited performance
and limited capacity present themselves as inseparable, even identical, postulates. Here, we aim to
scrutinize the conceptual and empirical underpinnings of these postulates, and we end by rejecting
both of them as either determinable or veridical aspects of human functioning.
We do this from the perspective of what has become known as ‘embodied’ or ‘grounded’ cog-
nition, which is to say that our explanatory concepts stem from a focus on the corporeal organism
interacting adaptively with its environment. The components of that interaction are the sensory-
motor processes of the organism and the way in which they enable it to gather information about
and interact dynamically with its ecology. There are a vast range of projects and approaches that
fall under the general term ‘embodiment’ (for broad overviews, see e.g., Glenberg, 1997; Wilson,
2002; Barsalou, 2008; Lakoﬀ, 2012), but here, the relevance stems from our attempt to provide an
alternative account for phenomena that classical cognitive science has sought to explain in terms of
processes (e.g., encoding, storage, decay, interference) operating on ‘central’ representations whose
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essential form transcends the perceptual processes whereby they
may be transduced and the motor processes whereby they may be
converted into actions. We begin to pose our alternative, embod-
ied approach by considering the basis of the foundational ideas of
capacity limitation in cognitive science and set it within a broader,
general critique of cognition.
Capacity Limitation and the Genesis of
Cognitive Psychology
When the crisis of Behaviorism occurred in the psychology of
the 1950s, key advances in a range of domains provided a con-
text for new thinking about human behavior. In particular, in
a decade that was to shape human endeavor in many ways,
a range of ideas which could be readily applied to an under-
standing of human performance were those about information
processing and the programmable digital computer. There are
two interconnected aspects of these ideas that provide the foun-
dational basis for cognitive psychology: ﬁrst, quanta of informa-
tion can be posited, and, second, there are limits to the number
of quanta that can be processed at any given moment (e.g.,
Shannon and Weaver, 1949; Turing, 1950). From this perspec-
tive, the limited performance of a device derives ultimately from
the limited capacity for information transmission of its basic
processing systems.
If the basis of intelligent behavior is the manipulation and
transformation of such quanta of information (e.g., Newell,
1990), then it is necessary to establish what that quantum is in
a given setting. Cognitive psychology construes capacity limi-
tation in a variety of ways. For some, it is construed as struc-
turally limited ‘slots’ for the representation of information (e.g.,
Luck and Vogel, 1997). For others, it manifests as ﬁnite process-
ing resources that must be allocated over units of information
(e.g., Cowan, 1995; Bays and Husain, 2008), or as temporal con-
straints on the maintenance of certain types of information
(e.g., Baddeley et al., 1975; Barrouillet et al., 2011). Others model
capacity limitation in terms of interactions between represen-
tations of diﬀerent elements of information leading to inter-
ference or displacement (Lewandowsky and Oberauer, 2009).
Others incorporate more than one such conception. Our critique
here applies to all of these approaches as they all, in positing
capacity-limited processing systems, share a fundamental under-
lying assumption; the very idea of capacity limitation necessarily
connotes some primordial unit to which that capacity relates
and by which it can be determined. Most commonly, in relation
to capacity, these units are thought of as items or chunks (e.g.,
Miller, 1956; Newell and Simon, 1976; Cowan, 2000). However,
while the item or chunk is conceived of as the basic unit to
which processing is addressed, its dimensions or content are
not necessarily the same in all settings; for a given process,
a newly-learned multisyllabic word may be seen as an item
formed of pre-existing syllables, but at the same time, those
syllables may be deconstructed into smaller elements, such as
phonemes.
So, even though they form a basic sine qua non for the idea
that intelligent behavior may be thought of as the manipulation
of units of information, what those elements might actually
be – how they are to be quantized and quantiﬁed – is already
far from clear. Cognition sidesteps this problem in operational
terms by asserting what the experimenter or modeler judges to
be the basic unit of any given task setting. Modeling attempts,
while often explicitly remaining agnostic as to what the actual
unit is, nonetheless proceed by asserting what it should be. So,
within theories of short-term memory (e.g., Page and Norris,
1998; Burgess and Hitch, 1999; Henson, 1999), it may be a syl-
lable or word, deﬁned by a set of abstract features (vector values
which themselves might be conceived of as primordial, or per-
haps their constituent dimensions should be, and so on). The
issue is exempliﬁed in generative linguistics. Here, a formal and
explicit attempt is made to deﬁne the primordial elements of
a speech act in terms of phonological features that are cen-
tral, in that they are meant to map to perception and execution
while transcending both. So, for example, Chomsky and Halle
(1968) posit a ﬁnite (provisional) set of phonological features
from which all utterances may be assembled. This is just one
example of the attempt to determine the basic units to which
processing is addressed; in general terms, however, the endeavor
pervades cognitive psychology, most assiduously perhaps in those
attempts at quantifying capacity, where consideration may be
given to whether, for example, a red circle should be deemed
an item, or whether the critical quantities relate separately to its
shape, its color, its location, and so on (e.g., Hardman and Cowan,
2014).
The problem here is knowing where to stop in the super-
or sub-ordinate direction on any other than arbitrary (or arbi-
trarily expedient) grounds. More critically, by whatever means
the determination of the units is achieved, a fundamental issue
remains, which is that the problem that the cognitive sys-
tem is meant to solve in order to support coherent behavior
must disappear at some level of granularity, and if the prob-
lem can disappear at that level of granularity, why not at any
other? Take, for example, the classic ‘problem of serial order’
(Lashley, 1951), a problem to which much formal theorizing
about limited capacity short-term memory addresses itself. The
problem of serial order is that since an organism’s behavior
is temporally extended, the organism must implement some
process whereby appropriate elements of that behavior are exe-
cuted in the appropriate order. However, if it is indeed the
case that a fundamental problem of behavior is that of the
serial order of units of behavior, then there must necessarily
be a point of granularity in behavior at which it is no longer
a problem. This is so, simply because to posit the problem in
this way means that there must be some primordial, indissol-
uble unit to which the ordering process is applied, otherwise
one ﬁnds oneself, à la Zeno, in a regression to inﬁnitesimally
smaller levels of granularity. Thus, this conceptual approach
to accounting for temporally extended behavior has to posit a
realm where time does not exist (see Port and Leary, 2005). As
with serial order, so with any other cognitive process: if there
are a priori units which are the objects of constrained infor-
mation processing, then those units must exist outside those
constraints and must themselves already be formed, fully and
indissolubly.
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The Nature of Symbolic Technologies
and the Nature of Human Thought
The project of limited-capacity short-term memory, therefore,
rests logically and methodologically on the possibility of posit-
ing a priori quanta that are essentially discrete and static: if they
are not discrete, then this implicates basic quanta at either sub-
or superordinate levels (which is to say that the a priori quanta
for assessing capacity have been inappropriately deﬁned), while
if they are not static, then they are not amenable to the quan-
tiﬁcation on which the idea of capacity limitation necessarily
rests. Before proposing an alternative to this general approach,
we ﬁrst consider why it is that human thought has come to be
conceptualized in these cognitivist terms, and why an alternative
conceptualization is necessary.
We argue here (see also Port, 2007; Wray, 2014) that the
communicative technologies (of which writing is a prime exam-
ple) developed by humans exert a profound inﬂuence on our
intuitions, even as scientists, about the content and constituents
of our behavior. The accomplishments of Homo Sapiens, and
those that distinguish us from other animals, are less to do with
the peculiarity or complexity of our behavior and our mastery
over our environment than with the fact that we have devel-
oped symbolic technologies that serve to represent and organize
that behavior. The products of the medieval cathedral builders
are not so much distinguished from those of desert termites
with respect to their architectural virtuosity, but in the fact
that those cathedrals were ﬁrst represented conceptually in a
symbolic form – a plan – that could serve to coordinate the var-
ious inputs to those accomplishments (e.g., Marx, 1844/2007).
Critical for current concerns, for about 6000 years human soci-
eties have been elaborating technologies for representing the
meaningful contents of acts of speaking. The key feature of
these technologies for our argument here, and that underly-
ing their eﬃciency and survival, is that they comprise a ﬁnite
set of discrete, static, a priori elements – symbols that may be
assigned to the putative constituent sounds of speech – that
can be lawfully combined in diﬀerent ways to represent the
utterances produced within a language. From early Phoenician
attempts, through to the International Phonetic Alphabet we
witness symbolic technologies that represent speech as an assem-
bly of serially ordered segments that are discrete and static.
As with written language, so too the technologies of logic and
mathematics: they have been elaborated and reﬁned to pro-
vide ever more powerful and abstract means of thinking about
nature in terms of the lawful combination and transformation of
symbols.
However, prime facie motivation for favoring an embodied
over a traditional cognitivist approach to human thought arises
because, unlike the static and discrete nature of symbolic tech-
nologies, biological systems and processes are inherently variable,
graded and continuous in time and space, and so translating the
behavior of those systems into descriptions based on the manip-
ulation of discrete, static symbols necessarily loses something
of the essence of those systems. In itself this is not a problem
and may even be a necessity; analytic methodologies of whatever
stripe have progressed by developing technologies for ‘freezing’
this inﬁnite gradation and variability, be it via the mathemat-
ics of calculus or the phonetic transcription of an utterance.
Furthermore, if the gradation and variability that characterizes
the observable behavior of biological systems were merely a sur-
face aspect either of our measurement processes or of the noisy
contingencies of any particular instance of behavior (just such an
assumption lies at the heart of the generative approach to lan-
guage), then again, the translation from graded and variable to
discrete and static would pose no particular underlying issue.
However, the development of dynamic systems theory, and a
body of evidence that would not have been obtainable with-
out the developments in computing power in recent decades,
have revealed that, far from being contingent or epiphenome-
nal, this graded, variable nature of biological systems is precisely
the essential characteristic that enables them to give rise to new
forms through phylogenetic and ontogenetic development (e.g.,
Thelen and Smith, 1994).
As with biological systems generally, so too with language,
where the massive variability in actually perceived and produced
language – variability arising from contextual factors ranging
from the level of the utterance, to that of the individual physical
and environmental heritage, to that of the history of a partic-
ular linguistic community – serves (while posing a challenge
for the language learner) as the engine for development, both
in the particular phonological form of a given language and in
the acquisition of that language by any individual learner (e.g.,
Pierrehumbert, 2003; Port, 2010). It is unsurprising, from this
perspective, that the technologies designed to capture spoken
language – based on the lawful combination of a ﬁnite set of
static segments – obscure many of its inherent characteristics
and functions. In this respect, the disjunctions between linguis-
tic technologies and speech are manifold and well-known, from
the famous elusiveness of invariant phonemes in actual speech,
to the deliquescence under critical scrutiny of things whose exis-
tence seems as self-evident as ‘words’ (Wray, 2014), and the
remarkably formulaic behavior of utterances that, to the literate,
appear readily analyzable and manipulable (Goldberg, 2003; See
Beckner et al., 2009 for an overview).
So, while our symbolic technologies for studying nature are, by
design, static and discrete, that which we use them to understand
is variable and graded. There should be nothing controversial
in the observation that these symbolic technologies are not the
same as the things to which they apply. We maintain, how-
ever, that so immersed are we, not only in the use of speech
and in its formal segmental representation in writing, but also
in the process of translating from one to the other and back
again, that the nature of the technology for representing the thing
comes to appear to us as constituting the essential nature of the
thing itself. Indeed, many of our intuitions about the nature of
speech turn out to derive from conventions of literacy train-
ing rather than inherent essential properties of speech sounds
or acts (Port, 2007; Wray, 2014). As such, we argue, the cogni-
tivist conception of human thought constitutes a reiﬁcation – one
which an embodied approach has the potential to overcome –
whereby those symbolic technologies that are used to represent
our thought processes are taken to embody the essential nature
of those processes.
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A host of conceptual problems can be traced to this reiﬁ-
cation, not least the essential idea in cognition that any act is
the end result of a mental plan that is both precursor to and
preﬁgurative of that act. While some older critiques of such
ideas may not receive much current consideration (e.g., Ryle,
1949), more contemporary ones continue to gain purchase (e.g.,
Thelen and Smith, 1994). The outcome on which we are focused
here, however, is that the conﬂation of the technology with the
process of interest – exempliﬁed here by language – leads to
the sense that the process itself involves the lawful assembly and
manipulation of discrete, static a priori units, rather than being
inherently graded, variable and dynamic. However, a particular
characteristic of the typical conduct of cognitive science serves to
circumvent, or at least obscure, such problems; the material input
and output of the process under investigation is already opera-
tionally quantized and ordered, and so the relationship between
those inputs and outputs which forms the basis of inference about
the processes whereby the inputs are transformed to outputs will
necessarily aﬀord description in quantized and ordered terms.
A clear illustration of the distinction between approaching
a process from a traditional cognitivist versus an embodied
approach can be seen in relation to the study of speech errors
that plays a key role in theories of speech production gener-
ally. Importantly, the patterns of such errors is typically taken
to provide strong support for the idea that speaking involves the
lawful assembly of segments into extended utterances according
to syntactic constraints across lexical, sub-lexical, and supra-
lexical levels. (see e.g.,Meyer, 1992; Dell et al., 1993; Levelt, 1993).
However, as has been noted elsewhere (Port, 2010) the transcrip-
tion of utterances into an ordered series of discrete tokens –
transcription that provides the basis for the analysis of error pat-
terns – means that the data, while it can reveal diﬀerent kinds of
constraints on segmental order errors, can only reveal segmental
order errors, and therefore the possible accounts of those errors
is already constrained to those based on the ordering of discrete
segments, excluding variations of other kinds.
The problem with this becomes evident when speech errors
are examined instead through real-time measurement of vocal
tract movement during speaking (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2007).
Such studies reveal that speech errors, like other types of errors in
movement, reﬂect outcomes of simultaneous and graded execu-
tion of more than one gesture at any moment, rather than erro-
neous and exclusive assignment of segments to ordered frames.
For example, when required to repeatedly utter the pair ‘cop–top,’
people occasionally make errors such as, for example saying ‘cop–
cop.’ In a segmental transcription this error can only be one of
two things – either the exclusive substitution of the /k/ for the /t/
at the onset of the second syllable, or the exclusive substitution
of the word ‘cop’ for the word ‘top’; either way, the error con-
forms to a scheme whereby segments are assembled into ordered
frames. However, the actual movement of the vocal tract reveals
gradations in the errors, such that the dorsum of the tongue (the
place of articulation for /k/) varies in height at the point in time
when the speaker should be saying the onset of ‘top,’ involving
the tip of the tongue. In most cases it remains low but some-
times it achieves a height beyond that which would be appropriate
for execution of the target syllable ‘top.’ Importantly, not only
do these errors vary continuously (i.e., the dorsum does not just
bimodally occupy erroneous ‘up’ or correct ‘down’ positions),
but the erroneous movement of the dorsum is sometimes exe-
cuted simultaneously with the correct target movement of the
tip of the tongue to execute the /t/. The variation is continuous,
not discrete or categorical. Furthermore, when these movement
errors are compared with those present in phonetic transcription
of the utterances, many of them turn out not to be so recorded.
Detailed real-time analysis, therefore, reveals a picture in which
errors of speech involve the simultaneous, graded and contin-
uous real-time execution of more than one articulatory gesture,
some of which may be captured by the discrete, ordered phonetic
transcription and some of which are not.
The key point here is that the methodology of converting
behavior into a discrete, ordered code not only obscures the
graded and continuous nature of behavior, but ensures that expla-
nations of that behavior in terms of discrete ordered segments
are the only ones that present themselves. Here the conﬂation of
behavior with the technology for representing it not only engen-
ders a particular way of construing the essence of that behavior,
but also means that the evidence collected about that behav-
ior comes in a form that necessarily accords with the particular
paradigmatic assumptions – that is, that the behavior of interest
can be understood in terms of the processing of discrete, static
units – and so will never cast doubt, in itself, on the appropriate-
ness of that very paradigm. This precise problem exists in relation
to capacity: if we performatively determine what the primordial
units of processing are, and we implement those units in the input
and chronicle their appearance or otherwise in the output, not
only may we never quite settle on a precise determination of what
the capacity of the system is (and the literature has not, to date,
settled on such), neither will we ever see evidence that we are
fundamentally misconstruing the nature of the process we are
trying to understand. So, the ongoing theoretical debate about the
capacity of short-term memory focuses on questions about what
the primordial unit is and how it is to be operationally observed
(items, features, chunks, etc.), how many diﬀerent types of unit
there are (verbal, non-verbal, spatial, visual, etc.), and how many
and what type of systems there are for processing each of them.
Dissolving the Question of Capacity:
Dynamic Objects Versus Static Items
Rather than seeking explanations of limited performance within
the structural characteristics of purported systems and represen-
tations underpinning that performance, we instead advocate a
framework that focuses on the dynamic interplay of three broad
aspects of any given performance setting (see Figure 1 for a
schematic representation), none of which alone can be said to
be determinate of performance. The ﬁrst aspect of the setting is
the particular task that must be accomplished. This involves not
merely the attribution of a function such as ‘short-term mem-
ory’ to a particular task, but a speciﬁc consideration of the precise
requirements of process. So, for example, serial recall, involving
the reproduction of a sequence after a brief interval, is funda-
mentally diﬀerent from serial recognition within which no such
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of the framework, within which
performance is a dynamic outcome of three broad classes of factor,
each of which may modify the influence of each of the others.
reproduction is required. A second aspect is the nature and form
of thematerial upon which the particular taskmust be performed.
Here too, consideration must go beyond mere questions of con-
tent – e.g., verbal versus visuospatial information – and must
also address aspects of the formal organization of that particu-
lar content as it may impact on its perception. The third aspect
is the available repertoire of the performer such as it may be
deployed given the two preceding aspects. This repertoire is con-
strued as including general and speciﬁc skills (e.g., the general
ability for ﬂuent speech production and the speciﬁc familiarity
with a particular set of verbal material) as well as the performer’s
perceptual and motor functions (for similar perspectives, see e.g.,
Craik and Lockhart, 1972; Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995).
The limit to performance – ‘capacity’ – within this frame-
work is a direct consequence of the conﬂuence of these three
broad aspects, with greater congruence amongst them leading
to better performance. In this way, our account draws on and
elaborates upon the notion of aﬀordance (e.g., Gibson, 1977;
Norman, 1988). It shifts the explanatory role of perceptual-motor
processing into the foreground, making it a central concern in
explanations of short-term memory performance, rather than,
as is more conventionally the case, assigning it to the realm of
peripheral input/output processing.
None of these aspects of the setting is regarded here as deter-
mined, or indeed determinate, in an a priori way. Therefore, the
explanatory framework we propose is immune from the type of
problems discussed above with a priori speciﬁcation of the nature
of the items to be processed and the structural properties of the
systems that do that processing that inhere in the traditional view
of capacity-limited short-term memory. Our objective here, then,
is not to resolve the question of capacity, but to supplant it. The
key conceptual component of this is to replace the notion of
an item as the explanatory unit, with the notion of an object.
This is not an unproblematic notion, although the diﬃculties are
fundamentally diﬀerent to those that accompany the notion of
an item. The problematic character of the object, as we use it
here, stems from its inherently dynamic nature – it resides nei-
ther in the environment, nor in the eye of the beholder, nor in
the particular task goals on a given occasion, but rather in the
dynamic interplay amongst all three aspects. Undoubtedly, prop-
erties of perceptual systems – a function of both ontogenetic and
phylogenetic adaptations – and the environment the organism
encounters play a key role in the formation of objects, but as a
functional unit of performance, the object is also constrained and
modiﬁed by the particular task at hand. So, an object is brought
into beingmomentarily by the characteristics of these three broad
aspects and dissolves or mutates with changes in those aspects. In
one setting, the object of performance may be a holistic, tempo-
rally extended sequence of sounds, while with a change in, for
example, the acoustic properties of that sound, or in the task
that has to be performed, the object is transformed into larger or
smaller objects. We provide detailed instantiations of these ideas
in following sections.
Objects are instantiated in both perceptual and motor forms,
with the impact of obligatory and deliberate processes mani-
fested diﬀerently in the two domains. Perceptual systems serve
to organize information from the environment into objects in an
obligatory way, although some environmental input – exempli-
ﬁed in vision by the Necker cube – is also amenable to deliberate
reorganization (see e.g., Macken et al., 2003). Movement is also
object-oriented in this sense, but here, deliberate, goal-directed
action is implicated more typically, for example, in the selec-
tion of a particular manual grip conﬁguration to use a tool for
cutting as opposed to stabbing. This mapping of perceptual-
obligatory and motor-deliberate is not exclusive. So, the oblig-
atory processes of perceptual object formation may establish
in a given environment (including both the material and the
task) a set of aﬀordances that may be obligatorily mapped onto
systems for motor control. Thus, motor control systems are
under a degree of obligatory access from perceptual systems (e.g.,
Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001; Hickok and Poeppel, 2004). At the
same time, the particular activity of motor control systems may
inﬂuence the precise way in which the perceptual system orga-
nizes information in the environment (e.g., Ganel and Goodale,
2003). Thus, objects are formed dynamically out of the com-
bined inﬂuence of the three broad aspects of the setting described
above. Changes in any aspect may lead to changes in the form
of these functional units. The level of performance achieved in
any given setting is then a function of the readiness with which
appropriate objects to accomplish the task may be formed, and
obstacles to task performance are due either to impediments to
the ready formation of appropriate objects or to the ready for-
mation of objects that are inappropriate to the particular task
requirements.
Below, we demonstrate the usefulness of this approach for
understanding short-term memory performance by providing a
detailed account of empirical ﬁndings to explicate how these
concepts play out, and how they provide a coherent account
of performance in short-term memory. In replacing the item
with the object, our approach overcomes the problem of what
the a priori units of processing are by not seeking to posit such
units in the ﬁrst place. Rather, we begin analytically by doing
away with the assumption that there is any primordial unit, the
manipulation of which underpins performance. Necessarily this
requires methodological bootstrapping whereby we quantify per-
formance under various conditions, but without actually insisting
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that the process of quantiﬁcation addresses the essential units of
that performance. The success or otherwise of this approach may
be judged in the detailed account of empirical phenomena dis-
cussed below. Beyond this, in conceiving of the functional units
of performance in momentary, dynamic terms, the question of
deriving an underlying capacity limitation is obviated, since a
change in any of the inputs to the dynamic system may fun-
damentally change the system’s performance in relation to the
task requirements, and do so in an unlimited way. Throughout
the following empirical examples, we illustrate these concepts in
a concrete way, illustrating the superiority of such an account
of performance that focuses on the speciﬁc nature of the task,
the form and content of the material, and the repertoire of
skills and perceptual-motor processes of the participant over one
that seeks to invoke capacity-limited systems underpinning that
performance.
Language and Short-Term Memory:
Repertoire, Material, and Task
We begin discussion of how these ideas play out empirically by
considering the role of language in short-term memory perfor-
mance, not only because it forms a key focus in theories of the
structure and functions of putative short-term memory systems,
but also because language presents itself as a cognitive system
par excellence. Conventional approaches explain the role of lin-
guistic familiarity in short-term memory (e.g., lexical frequency)
through its eﬀect in supporting stability and/or retrievability, via
long-term representations, of the volatile short-term representa-
tions being processed within verbal short-term memory, thereby
ameliorating some of the eﬀects of limited capacity (see e.g.,
Hulme et al., 1991; Schweickert, 1993; Gathercole et al., 2001).
Some deﬁcits associated with this account are illustrated in a
series of experiments that manipulates such familiarity with the
verbal material (Woodward et al., 2008).
A typical experiment from that series involved short-term
serial recall for sequences of non-words (i.e., ones which, at
the outset, were novel to the participants). Twelve such non-
words were divided into two sets (set A and set B, each of six
non-words). The beginning of the procedure involved assessing
participants’ skill (ﬂuency) in saying aloud this verbal material.
They were required to read from a computer screen, as quickly
and accurately as possible, three types of presentation: single non-
words, pairs of non-words and six-non-word sequences. For the
pairs and sequences, the stimuli were either ‘pure,’ in that they
were drawn solely from either the A or the B set, or ‘mixed,’
in that they were constructed from alternate non-words drawn
from each set. While all participants bring their general ﬂu-
ent speaking ability to the setting, they were then familiarized
with this material via 60 trials of serial recall for six-non-word
sequences constructed of random orderings of A and B sets
(30 trials for each set). Only ‘pure’ sequences were presented
during this familiarization phase. Importantly, each of the 12
non-words was encountered equally often within this familiar-
ization phase, and so all the individual items should become
comparably familiar.
Following this phase, the measures of ﬂuency described
above were taken and compared with baseline skill measures.
Familiarization with the material via the serial recall phase led
to no reduction in spoken rate for either singles or pairs of
non-words. However, the practice phase did enhance the ﬂu-
ency with which 6-non-word sequences were produced, indicated
by a reduction in the time taken to speak aloud the sequences.
Importantly, this enhancement was not merely due to practice
with rehearsing and recalling sequences of this length, since the
enhancement only occurred for ‘pure’ sequences with no change
in the ﬂuency with which ‘mixed’ sequences were produced as
a result of the practice. This, then, indicates a very speciﬁc skill
enhancement in this setting. What is more, when serial recall
performance was subsequently tested, this speciﬁc skill enhance-
ment led to superior recall performance for ‘pure’ versus ‘mixed’
lists, even though each type of list is constructed from items that
have been encountered equally often during the familiarization
phase.
Clearly, therefore, no explanation couched solely in terms of
familiarity with supposed elements of the material (‘items’) or
familiarity with the particular task (serial recall) can account for
performance. It might be argued that the familiarization phase
led to the establishment of representations of each item organized
in associative networks deﬁned by set, and that such associations
provide support during recall which will be more evident for
pure than mixed sequences (see e.g., Stuart and Hulme, 2000).
However, in its focus on the maintenance and retrievability of
volatile short-term representations, it is not clear that such a
process could also account for the speciﬁc enhancement in ﬂu-
ency of speech output when the verbal material does not need to
be recalled, but is merely read aloud from the screen. In other
words, an account couched in traditional terms would need to
suggest diﬀerent mechanisms giving rise to the recall advantage
and to the ﬂuency advantage. On the other hand, an account
which emphasizes the increased ﬂuency in motor control associ-
ated with speciﬁc articulatory practice at assembling sequences of
non-words from each of the two sets suﬀers no such lack of parsi-
mony; the recall advantage and the ﬂuency advantage are merely
two consequences of the particular conﬂuence of the task require-
ments, the nature of the material, and the speciﬁc skill within the
participant’s repertoire.
Undoubtedly, while such evidence raises problems with the
general conceptualisation of the role of language in short-term
memory, in itself it does not necessarily undermine the notion
of ‘central’ items and chunks which underpin theorizing about
limited capacity systems. Indeed, such evidence of eﬀects of expe-
rience on a range of skills (memory and ﬂuency) ﬁts readily
with classical cognitive ideas about the formation of chunks from
smaller entities as a function of practice (e.g., Newell and Simon,
1976). However, a number of other aspects of these eﬀects seem to
point more speciﬁcally to a motor – speciﬁcally co-articulatory –
basis to the increased performance, rather than to the formation
of larger chunks in central representations of the material. For
example, the type of sequential practice described above with a
set of non-words led to enhanced subsequent performance with
a diﬀerent set of non-words if that set contained the same artic-
ulatory oﬀsets and onsets between non-words as the familiarized
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sets. However, no such transfer occurred for sets of non-words
that shared the internal vowel segment with the practiced set
(Woodward et al., 2008, Experiment 3). Similarly, if the familiar-
ization task involved the practiced sequences being uttered in a
paced fashion so as to prevent actual co-articulation of successive
non-words, then the particular advantage for pure over mixed
sequences did not emerge, even though each set of non-words
had been encountered together in a practice sequence the same
number of times (Woodward, unpublished).
Further non-trivial shortcomings in the classical cognitivist
account of the role of language in short-term memory perfor-
mance become evident when the detailed aspects of the task and
the perceptual form of the material are examined. Key evidence
for the classical, item-oriented, account of the inﬂuence of long-
term linguistic knowledge on short-term memory relates to the
diﬀerent inﬂuence of such knowledge on serial recall and serial
recognition; a robust inﬂuence of linguistic familiarity (speciﬁ-
cally, lexicality) is found when performance is tested by serial
recall, but that eﬀect is signiﬁcantly diminished or eliminated
when performance involves serial recognition. The key functional
distinction between these two tasks is that in recall, the require-
ment is to reproduce in some form the previously presented
sequence, while in recognition, a sequence is presented, followed
by a second sequence, identical to or slightly diﬀerent from (e.g.,
two adjacent items may be transposed) the original, and the task
requires a same/diﬀerent judgment. The substantial superiority
of recall for words over non-words, and the relative absence of
this eﬀect in recognition has been taken to point to a role for lin-
guistic knowledge in supporting the short-term maintenance or
retrieval of verbal items; by re-presenting the memory items in
the test cue a role for processes involved in the short-term reten-
tion of information about those items is obviated. In this way, the
interaction between lexicality (words/non-words) and task (serial
recall/serial recognition) provides key evidence for speciﬁcally
mnemonic process (retrieval, maintenance) operating on item-
level representations in short-term memory (e.g., Baddeley, 2003;
Jeﬀeries et al., 2009).
However, since such accounts are typically focussed on pro-
cesses operating on central representations (maintenance, decay,
interference, retrieval, etc.), the question of modality in which
the material is presented is one that, until recently, went over-
looked; speciﬁcally, while serial recall tasks have commonly been
presented in both auditory and visual forms, serial recognition
has almost always been implemented auditorily. For this reason,
theorizing about the role of linguistic familiarity in short-term
memory represents a case study in the folly of a paradigm that
that relegates perception and motor control to matters of mere
input to and output from a central system, the operation of which
gives rise to the essential aspects of performance. We argued
above that a key aspect of the inﬂuence of familiarity with lin-
guistic material resides in the readiness with which it can be
assembled (e.g., via co-articulatory ﬂuency) into an extended
sequence of articulatory gestures of the type that may subsume
the reproduction of a sequence required in serial recall tasks.
Indeed, there is abundant evidence that the inﬂuence of familiar-
ity with a set of verbal material is particularly evident in settings
in which performance involves the production or reproduction of
extended sequences, rather than individual words (e.g., Wright,
1979; Woodward et al., 2008; Bybee, 2010). As already noted,
serial recognition does not involve the requirement for sequence
reproduction.
Furthermore, and critically in this context, temporally
extended auditory sequences may be processed as holistic audi-
tory objects such that they aﬀord matching with other auditory
objects in a global fashion – that is, one that does not rely on iden-
tiﬁcation and comparison of the ostensible constituent elements
across the two sequences to be judged same or diﬀerent. For
example, classic studies on the perception of auditory sequences
have shown that people are able to judge whether two rapid
sequences of the same sounds (e.g., a tone, a buzz, a hiss and
a click) are in the same or diﬀerent order without being able to
identify what the order of the sounds is, or indeed to identify, for
diﬀerent sequence pairs, which elements have been re-ordered.
The ability to identify the constituent source of any diﬀerences
emerges only when the sequences are presented at a suﬃciently
slow rate (around 4–5 items per second) as to allow for each suc-
cessive sound to be verbally labeled (see Warren, 1999). As such,
given certain acoustic properties (such as rate and spectral simi-
larity), the sequence of sounds functions a single unit – an object
– while changes in those acoustic properties enables its dissolu-
tion into smaller objects. As the compass of the object changes,
the type of performance aﬀorded varies, facilitating either global
matching of sequences or identiﬁcation of individual constituents
of the sequence along with their order.
Given this, presenting a sequence at certain rates in audi-
tory form aﬀords sequence matching performance that is, strictly,
only nominally based on sequential processing; rather, the task
can be construed as one in which a single auditory object is
compared with another. Serial recall, on the other hand, since
it always requires at output the reproduction of a sequence,
will be inﬂuenced by the readiness with which such a sequence
may be assembled from the input material regardless of its pre-
sentation modality – readiness that is facilitated by linguistic
familiarity (Wright, 1979; Woodward et al., 2008). From this
perspective, the interaction between lexicality and task type
emerges not, as the classical account has it, because of the dif-
ferent burden on item retention in recall versus recognition
together with the increased robustness of such item retention
for linguistically familiar material. Rather it is because audi-
tory sequences may be processed as single objects, and so tasks,
like serial recognition, that may be accomplished with such a
perceptual form, based on global perceptual matching, will not
exhibit eﬀects due the readiness with which its constituents
may be processed. We tested this idea via the simple exten-
sion of examining serial recognition and serial recall for both
auditory and visual forms of presentation (Macken et al., 2014).
Although presentation and retrieval conditions were held con-
stant across modalities, sequential presentation of visual verbal
materials in the same location does not aﬀord the same object
formation that auditory presentation does and so the burden
on sequential processing of the constituents is increased in that
setting relative to auditory presentation. We showed that while
the eﬀect of lexicality was present regardless of presentation
modality when serial recall was required, in serial recognition
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it was also present with visually presented lists but absent for
auditory lists. The classical account, in which the inﬂuence of
linguistic familiarity operates via enhanced processing of item-
level lexical or syllabic representations, cannot account for this
interaction. According to that view the inﬂuence of linguistic
familiarity is minimized in settings where the burden on item
retention is minimized, that is in serial recognition where the
items are re-presented and there is no requirement on the par-
ticipant to reproduce the content of the sequence. This condition
applies whether recognition is auditory or visual – both forms
involve re-presentation of the original items; hence, the eﬀect
of lexicality of the material should be the same regardless of
presentation modality. From the object-based perspective, the
eﬀect is absent in serial recognition only when the material is
presented auditorily since such a form of presentation aﬀords
holistic object matching, thus minimizing the need for pro-
cesses associated with the deliberate assembly of the material
into a sequence. For visual presentation there is no such aﬀor-
dance; therefore, the items must be encoded individually and
composed into a sub-vocal sequence, a process that is modu-
lated by linguistic familiarity. That the eﬀect does indeed reside
within the speech motor system, rather than within enhanced
processing of lexical items, per se, receives further support from
the fact that the eﬀect of lexicality in visual serial recognition
is eliminated if the speech motor system is otherwise occupied
during the task (by requiring the participant to repeatedly whis-
per the task-irrelevant sequence 1, 2, 3... ; Macken et al., 2014,
Experiment 2).
The inﬂuence of language on short-term memory is, there-
fore, a complex one. Certainly, it is one in which perceptual and
motor processes play a critical role, but even that does not tell
the complete story, since a detailed consideration of the precise
task requirements is also necessary in order to fully delineate its
inﬂuence. Language presents itself as a skill, as both a generic
aspect of repertoire that enables the formation of speech motor
sequences that allow for the reproduction of target sequences, as
well as a more speciﬁc skill that relates to the enhanced readiness
with which particular sets of verbal material may be reproduced.
However, the role of motor skill may or may not be evident in
performance; some task settings may be addressed on a purely
perceptual basis, within which, if the perceptual repertoire of
the participant aﬀords it, eﬀects of linguistic familiarity may be
absent, while changes to the task or to the form of presentation
of the material may bring them back into play. Critically, it is
not clear how the traditional approach to capacity could encom-
pass this complex picture. With auditory serial recognition, the
functional unit of performance is the whole sequence, while with
visual serial recognition, the character of the constituents, along
with the sequence, determines performance. The items in one
setting are not manifest in the other, but neither is their manifes-
tation determined by the form of their presentation, since if the
task requirements are changed, the lexical character of the mate-
rial is manifest in performance regardless of modality. Discerning
in this pattern the lineaments of a system whose inherent char-
acteristic involves a limit to the number of items of a particular
type that may be processed is, we argue, a theoretically futile
project.
Objects, Affordances, and Short-Term
Memory
The way in which the objects rendered by the perceptual
repertoire of the participant, and the extent to which those objects
determine short-term memory performance, is also evident in
another canonical aspect of short-term memory performance
typically attributed to processes operating at the item level: the
talker variability eﬀect (e.g., Greene, 1991; Goldinger et al., 1991).
Serial recall for random sequences of, for example, spoken digits
presented in a single voice is superior to a sequence alternat-
ing between a male and female voice on successive digits. In
terms of the capacity-limited processing of items, this is usu-
ally explained by reference to an additional burden placed on
the encoding of those items (due to the need to represent the
indexical information relating to voice in the limited capac-
ity system or to the need to recode the variable input into a
homogenous, canonical form), thereby taxing the limited capac-
ity for storage and/or processing. It is possible, however, to
reconstrue these ﬁndings within our embodied, object-oriented
framework, without recourse either to the notion of item or
the burden placed on the limited capacity storage system by its
encoding.
This task requires serial reproduction (be it spoken, written,
typed, etc.) of the presented sequence of digits. When presented
in a single (say, female) voice, auditory perceptual processes
obligatorily organize that input into a single relatively coher-
ent sequential representation that matches the required output
order of the material. In other words, the content and formal
organization of the material aﬀords its ready mapping onto a
speech output (or rehearsal) sequence that accords with the
requirements of the task. However, that formal organization
is fundamentally changed when voices alternate, say between
male and female, from one spoken digit to the next. Under
these circumstances, perceptual organization partitions the input
into two objects, one corresponding to each voice. A substan-
tial body of work on auditory perception (e.g., Bregman, 1990;
Warren, 1999) has shown that a key consequence of this pro-
cess of object formation is that there is very little coherence
across objects; for example, the ability to discern the relative
ordering of elements belonging to diﬀerent objects is very poor,
compared to the ability to determine the ordering of elements
within an object. Consequently, neither of the objects formed
by the alternating voices maps readily onto the required out-
put form, since they represent sequences of alternate digits in
the input sequence. Thus, in alternating lists the degree to which
the material aﬀords ready mapping from the perceptual input to
the motor output is reduced due to obligatory perceptual pro-
cesses that organize the input into sequential representations
based on acoustic similarity, in this case the pitch and spec-
tral qualities of the voice (see Hughes et al., 2009). Performance
is reduced, therefore, since the combination of the form of the
material and the perceptual repertoire of the participant renders
objects that are less appropriate to the task requirement than
when that material is presented in an acoustically homogenous
form.
This partitioning of serial alternating voices into two
same-voice objects takes time to build up (see e.g., Bregman,
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1990; Carlyon et al., 2001), a fact that can be exploited to show
how object formation, not the capacity-limited processing of
individual items, is responsible for the talker-variability eﬀect.
The key manipulation involves a lead-in – a sequence of to-be-
ignored items (e.g., a countdown from 9 to 1) prior to, and at the
same tempo as the memory list – in either single- or alternating-
voice form (see Hughes et al., 2009). By allowing the build-up of
object formation to take place prior to presentation of the to-
be-remembered material, a lead-in of alternating voices should
promote perceptual segregation by voice within the alternating
to-be-remembered sequence, thereby reducing still further the
aﬀordance or mapping between input sequence and required
output sequence. If item encoding were responsible, this manip-
ulation would be expected, minimally, to have no eﬀect, or to
reduce the impact of voice alternation within the sequence by
virtue of familiarization with the acoustic variability. However,
the alternating voice lead-in causes further reduction in per-
formance beyond that found with the basic alternating voice
condition (Hughes et al., 2009).
This is not to say, however, that perceptual organization
alone determines performance since if the task requirements are
changed such that the same verbal material no longer needs to be
retained in order, but only memory for the content is required,
then the talker variability eﬀect no longer emerges as it does
when the requirement is for serial reproduction of the sequence
(Hughes et al., 2011). This further illustrates that the speciﬁc
interplay of the form and content of the material, the nature of
the task that needs to be accomplished with that material, and
the repertoire of the participant jointly determine performance
in a way that cannot readily be explained by reference to struc-
tural properties of any of those individual aspects alone. Since
all of these factors combine interdependently to determine the
level of performance, again we see the fundamental problem with
the project of limited capacity. We might frame the question
rhetorically: what is the correct combination of task, material and
participant repertoire to choose in order to accurately assay the
capacity of the underlying system?
Interference as Task-Irrelevant
Affordance
These foregoing examples illustrate the application of our frame-
work to settings in which only task-relevant material is pre-
sented to the participant. In our next example, we show how the
same framework applies in settings in which task-relevant and
task-irrelevant material is present. From the traditional, capacity-
limited perspective, the presence of task-irrelevant material taxes
the capacity-limited system via mechanisms such as depletion of
resources or structural interference between representations of
the relevant and irrelevant items, typically based on the simi-
larity between the two (see e.g., Cowan, 1995; Kane and Engle,
2003; Lavie, 2005; Oberauer and Lewandowsky, 2008; Baddeley,
2012). Within cognitive science more broadly, the assumption
that an observed reduction in performance in the presence of
task-irrelevant material must be due to some process leading to
the degradation of the item-level representations underpinning
that performance is one that is as unscrutinised as the conﬂation
of limited performance with limited capacity; rather, debate is
focused on the precise mechanism – decay, interference, depleted
processing resources, etc. – that leads to the degradation (e.g.,
Oberauer and Lewandowsky, 2008).Here we propose an alterna-
tive account of interference that does not rest on this assumption.
The shortcomings of the classical, item-focussed, cognitivist
perspective become clear when considering the impact on per-
formance of the presence of task-irrelevant sound during a
short-term memory task. The presentation of such sound, which
participants are instructed to ignore and on the contents of which
they are never tested, during a serial recall task leads to substan-
tial (typically on the order of 30–50%) disruption to serial recall
performance (e.g., Colle andWelsh, 1976; Salamé and Baddeley,
1982; Ellermeier and Zimmer, 1997). The eﬀect cannot be due
to the depletion of limited processing resources; the size of the
eﬀect does not diminish with time, either over the duration of an
experimental procedure or over days and weeks (Hellbrück et al.,
1996; Jones et al., 1997b), nor is predictable sound less disrup-
tive than unpredictable sound (Tremblay and Jones, 1998), nor
is the degree of disruption related to any other measures of
what are considered a participant’s ability to resist distraction
(Beaman, 2004). Neither can the eﬀect be attributed to struc-
tural interference between representations of irrelevant and rel-
evant items; the sound need not be verbal, nor is its disruptive
potency a function of its similarity to the task-relevant material
(see Macken et al., 2009). There are nonetheless basic, acous-
tic characteristics that are necessary within the sound for the
eﬀect to emerge; the sound must be perceptually segmentable
(e.g., due to the presence of silent intervals between successive
sound tokens or the presence of rapid modulations in frequency
and/or amplitude within continuous sound, such as are found
in continuous speech), and each segmented entity must be dif-
ferent from the preceding one. Perceptually continuous sounds,
or repetitions of an identical token do not cause disruption
(Jones et al., 1993). In other words, the sound must constitute
a sequence, of whatever content. However, again, this aspect
does not, on its own, determine performance in the presence
of such sound. If the task requirements are changed so that
reproduction of the memory sequence is no longer required,
while retaining the requirement to remember all the content,
then performance is unaﬀected by the presence of task-irrelevant
acoustic sequences. A task requiring reproduction of a sequence
constituted of a random ordering of all but one of the digits
1 through 9 will be substantially disrupted by the presence of
task-irrelevant auditory sequences. However, if precisely the same
material is presented, in precisely the same way, but now the task
requires identiﬁcation of which of the digits was missing from
that particular sequence, then no such disruption is evident (e.g.,
Jones and Macken, 1993; Beaman and Jones, 1998; Macken et al.,
1999). This task still requires retention of the content of the
sequence until the response is required, but the particular sequen-
tial order is no longer relevant (or useful) in accomplishing it.
Clearly, then, the sound is not disrupting performance by some-
how degrading the representations of the memory material, since
it should otherwise aﬀect any performance that depends on the
retention of that material.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 293
Macken et al. Short-term memory capacity
How does this pattern of disruption in the presence of task-
irrelevant material ﬁt within out framework? In our account of
the talker variability eﬀect, we argued that key details of that eﬀect
emerge from the way in which the acoustically variable form of
the verbal material leads to obligatory perceptual organization
that does not readily aﬀord what the participant is required to do
in the particular setting; it leads to the formation of two auditory
objects, neither of which corresponds to the target sequence. The
general point here is that, for task-relevant material, the greater
the appropriateness of the momentary object, i.e., the aﬀordance,
or perceptual-motor congruence, between the input and out-
put forms, the better performance will be. Precisely the same
mechanisms, we argue, are at play when we examine the disrup-
tive impact of task-irrelevant sound on the ability to reproduce
task-relevant sequences. To the extent that such sound aﬀords
the same activity that is required of the task-relevant material –
that is, sequential reproduction – then competing aﬀordances are
established within the setting that impact upon the ready accom-
plishment of the speciﬁc task goal. The impact does not operate
by degrading the representation of the relevant material, but by
providing an alternative object competing with the task-relevant
sequence for control of the motor output process required to
accomplish the task (analogous to eﬀects of competing aﬀor-
dances on reaching and grasping in the visuo-motor domain, see
e.g., Cisek, 2007). The serial recall task is one requiring the repro-
duction of a sequence, and the environment contains not only the
task-relevant sequence, but other sequences, which via processes
of obligatory perceptual organization render objects that repre-
sent potential, alternative candidates for control of the sequential
motor system utilized to perform the focal task. Thus, when the
requirement for sequential output, as embedded in serial recall, is
removed from the task and all that is required is retention of the
content, the presence in the setting of task-irrelevant sequential
aﬀordances is no longer of relevance for the accomplishment of
that task and so performance proceeds unhindered. So, if the task
does not require the construction of a sequential motor object
in order to reproduce the sequence, but rather only requires
retention of the content, there is no cost associated with the
presence of task-irrelevant sequences.
Precisely the same de-potentiation of disruption from task-
irrelevant material occurs if the sequential aﬀordances are
removed from that material. For example, Jones and Macken
(1995) contrasted the disruptive eﬀect of a repeated series of
three sound tokens presented in a spatial conﬁguration to give
rise to perception of a single recurring sequence of three tokens
(simultaneous stereophonic presentation via headphones) with
that of the same three tokens, presented with the same recur-
ring timing and order, but this time with each token presented
from a separate location (left, center, and right channels of the
headphones), thereby giving rise to the perception, not of a sin-
gle sequence, but of three non-sequential streams of sound (see
Figure 2). In the former case, the task-irrelevant material embod-
ies sequential aﬀordances, while in the latter, those aﬀordances
are stripped from the material by changing the form in which it is
presented. This manipulation dramatically attenuates disruption,
even though the content of the task-irrelevant material remains
the same in both cases. So, here too, an account framed in terms of
constituent items within task-irrelevant material competing with
those within the task-relevant source for limited capacity stor-
age or processing is untenable. The same content – the ostensible
items – is present in both cases within the relevant and irrelevant
material, but in one case the form of interaction leads to substan-
tial impairment in performance, while in the other it does not.
Interference as Object Formation
The power of this object-oriented approach in providing a bet-
ter explanation of eﬀects on performance classically attributed to
interference becomes evident in two further, very diﬀerent set-
tings in which the ostensibly degrading eﬀects of irrelevant on
relevant items within capacity-limited systems have been charted.
FIGURE 2 | The effect of the perceptual organization of task-irrelevant
sound on its ability to disrupt serial recall. The successive presentation of
each of the three sounds (labeled A, B, and C) to the same location leads to the
formation of a single, sequential object, competing with the target sequence.
Assigning each successive sound to a different location leads to a form of
organization in which the sound no longer contains sequential affordances.
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The ﬁrst involves the eﬀect of interpolated sound on the ability to
make same/diﬀerent judgments about the pitch of two successive
tones, and the second involves the disruptive eﬀect on serial recall
of auditory sequences of a redundant auditory item occurring
after sequence presentation.
A key focus for the debate about the source of limited capacity
in short-term memory involves the ability to retain informa-
tion about simple events in the presence of both variable time
delays and the presence of diﬀerent types of material interpolated
between the initial presentation of that event and the requirement
to make a judgment about it (e.g., Oberauer and Lewandowsky,
2008; Mercer and McKeown, 2010). Figure 3 depicts such a set-
ting in which it appears that performance is determined by
interference amongst the representations of items within a lim-
ited capacity system. The setting, from Deutsch (1970) involves
the presentation of a short tone – the standard – followed several
seconds later by another tone – the test – either identical to or dif-
ferent from (plus/minus a semitone) the standard. Diﬀerent types
of to-be-ignored material may be interpolated between tones, and
the task is to make a same/diﬀerent judgment.
The basic ﬁnding is that performance on the pitch discrimi-
nation task is substantially poorer when the interpolated material
comprises tones in a similar frequency range and with the same
timbre as the standard and test tones than when that material is
formed of spoken digits. On the face of it, this seems to provide
clear evidence for similarity-based interference within capacity-
limited storage; the representation of the standard tone is more
subject to degradation by other, similar-sounding tones, than by
the acoustically diﬀerent digits. As such, by the time the test tone
is presented, the information necessary to perform the task is still
relatively intact in the latter compared to the former condition
(e.g., Crowder, 1993). The capacity limits in the system under-
pinning the performance are therefore revealed by its inability
to sustain a level of performance when it must represent other,
similar, items to the target material compared to when no such
irrelevant material is present, or when the irrelevant material
is suﬃciently diﬀerent as to lead to no structural interference.
FIGURE 3 | Schematic depiction of the task from Deutsch (1970) and
Jones et al. (1997a). The standard tone (S) is succeeded either by a series of
other tones of varying frequency or by a random sequence of spoken digits,
followed in turn by the test tone (T) either identical in pitch to the standard, or
a semitone higher or lower.
However, a radically diﬀerent account of this classic ﬁnding is
provided by our object-oriented approach.
The starting point for this account is that the process of
object-formation has implications for the addressability of the
constituent features of that object. We touched on this in the
discussion of the perceptual basis of auditory serial recogni-
tion, with respect to the ﬁndings that judgments about whether
two auditory sequences are the same or diﬀerent may be made
even when access to the precise constituents that diﬀer (or not)
between the two sequences cannot be made (Warren, 1999).
Thus, the formation of an auditory object from an extended
sequence of sounds may impede the extent to which aspects of
the segments of that object may be identiﬁed. A classic demon-
stration of this is depicted in Figure 4, in which the task is to
judge whether the order of a pair of tones is the same or dif-
ferent on two instances (Bregman and Rudnicky, 1975). On the
second instance, the target tones are either presented unaccompa-
nied (Figure 4A) or in the presence of preceding and succeeding
‘ﬂanker’ tones close in frequency to the targets (Figure 4B).
Performance is markedly impaired under these conditions, but
not because the ﬂanker tones have somehow interfered with the
representations of the target tones. That this cannot be the source
of disruption is demonstrated in Figure 4C in which a series
of ‘captor’ tones is presented before and after, and at the same
frequency as, the ﬂanker tones.
Under these circumstances, performance is restored to that
observed when the targets are unaccompanied, although there is
now even more potentially ‘interfering’ material in the acoustic
setting. This pattern reveals the formation of diﬀerent auditory
FIGURE 4 | Depiction of three critical conditions from
Bregman and Rudnicky (1975). H, high tone, L, low tone, F, flanker tone,
C, captor tone. Order of H and L tones may be either the same or different on
both occasions. Panel (A) indicates condition where target test tones are
presented on their own, panel (B) indicates the addition of flanker tones
immediately before and after target test tones, and panel (C) indicates the
further addition of captor tones preceding and following the flanker tones.
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objects across the three settings; in the ﬁrst, the pairs of target
tones in the standard and test stimuli form an initial and subse-
quent object that aﬀords global matching in order to make the
judgment. In Figure 4B, when the target tones are re-presented
at test, they no longer form an object on their own, but rather are
bound into a diﬀerent object, along with the ﬂanker tones, which
does not aﬀord ready matching with the standard stimulus, since
the critical information needed to perform the task is now part
of, and embedded within, the test object. The presentation of the
captor tones serves to change the object formation again; in this
case the ﬂankers are bound into, on the basis of their identical
frequency, an object with the captor tones. The identical acous-
tic composition of the captor and ﬂanker tones forms a powerful
perceptual cue to them forming a coherent object in its own right,
leading to the perceptual segregation of the target material from
the preceding and succeeding material. This isolation as an object
once more permits ready comparison of standard and test stimuli.
It is not interference between item-level representations in
capacity-limited systems, therefore, but the addressability of
information that is the crux of performance in this setting. The
formation of elements into objects reduces the unique identiﬁ-
ability of those elements; they are no longer whole entities in
themselves, but rather need to be recovered from the object, and
there is a performance cost associated with this. Critically, it is
the process of object formation that determines the addressability
of those sub-object features, not processes of interference per se,
since all that is required for the information therein to become
readily addressable again is for a diﬀerent object organization
to be formed from the acoustic environment. The ﬁndings of
Bregman and Rudnicky (1975) illuminate the setting shown in
Figure 3 and the diﬀerent eﬀects of interpolated tones and speech
on the ability to judge whether or not the test and standard tones
are of the same frequency. When followed by a series of simi-
lar sounding tones, the standard is more likely to become bound
with those tones into an auditory object than when it is followed
by the acoustically distinct speech, therefore the addressability of
it as a tone in itself is reduced in the former compared to the lat-
ter. We tested this alternative account in a series of experiments
(Jones et al., 1997a), two key aspects of which are illustrated in
FIGURE 5 | Schematic depiction of two key manipulations from
Jones et al. (1997a). Panel (A) illustrates the manipulation of increasing the
interval between the standard and the first interpolated tone, while Panel (B)
illustrates the manipulation of doubling the number and rate of interpolated
tones. In both cases, performance is better in the conditions illustrated in
lower stimulus type than the upper one.
Figure 5. In the ﬁrst case (Figure 5A), we compared pitch dis-
crimination performance under conditions where the timing of
the tones was the same as that used in the original Deutsch
(1970) experiments – that is, the interval between the standard
and the ﬁrst interpolated tone was the same as that between
interpolated tones – with conditions where that initial interval
was increased. Notice here that the overall interval between stan-
dard and test tones has been increased by over a second, so the
period over which the comparison has to be made has increased
appreciably over the usual form of the task. Nonetheless, this
manipulation improves performance signiﬁcantly. However, the
same timingmanipulation (not depicted in Figure 5) with spoken
digits between standard and test tones had no eﬀect on perfor-
mance, so it is not simply the case that increasing the interval
between standard and interpolated material is advantageous to
performance; it is only so when such an increase is likely to aid
perceptual partitioning of the target material from the interpo-
lated, and such segmentation is already so strongly signiﬁed by
the change from pure tone to spoken digit that the timing is
redundant: the target and the interpolated material have formed
two distinct objects regardless of the timing manipulation. In
Figure 5B, the comparison is between the original type of stim-
ulus and one in which the rate at which interpolated tones are
presented is doubled. Again, notice that this means that the num-
ber of ostensibly interfering events between standard and test
tone has been doubled and yet, this leads to signiﬁcantly better
pitch discrimination performance; an eﬀect diametrically at odds
with the classical interference account of the eﬀect of interpolated
material. On the other hand, an account framed in terms of the
consequences of object formation for the addressability of ele-
ments within those objects provides a ready explanation; just as
with the manipulation depicted in Figure 5A, doubling the rate
at which the interpolated tones are presented (Figure 5B) leads
to them forming a coherent object in themselves, concomitantly
leading to the perceptual segmentation of the target tone from
that irrelevant material, thereby aﬀording more ready perceptual
matching.
It is not easy to see how this set of results can be explained
by reference to the decay of or interference with volatile short-
term memory representations within limited-capacity storage of
individual target events. Increasing the delay and increasing the
quantity of interpolated material actually improves performance,
and an account framed in terms of the formation of perceptual
objects, and the consequences that has for the addressability of
information within those objects provides a coherent account,
not only of the eﬀects depicted in Figure 5, but also of the
ﬁnding that performance is better when the interpolated mate-
rial is acoustically diﬀerent from the target material. Similarity
between operationally relevant and irrelevant sources of mate-
rial aﬀects performance, by this account, not due to processes of
interference leading to the degradation of item-level representa-
tions of the relevant information, but by aﬀecting the likelihood
that relevant information will be bound into a single integrated
object along with the irrelevant, coupled with the concomitant
loss of individual identity accompanied by such dynamic object
formation. The limits to performance, by this account, arise not
from burdens on limited capacity systems to store or process task
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relevant in the presence of task-irrelevant information, but rather
on the appropriateness or otherwise of the objects formed in the
setting – a function of the nature of the material and the percep-
tual repertoire of the participant – in the light of the particular
requirements of the given task.
Finally, we turn to yet another classic setting in which the
limited capacity of short-term retention systems has been investi-
gated – the suﬃx eﬀect (Crowder and Morton, 1969). This refers
to the ﬁnding that redundant auditory events occurring at the end
of a to-be-remembered auditory sequence disrupt serial recall of
that sequence, especially recall of items toward the end of that
sequence. For example, recall of a random sequence of the dig-
its 1–9 is disrupted if the last digit in the sequence is followed
by an auditory item that is not to be recalled (e.g., the spoken
word ‘go’). The more acoustically similar the suﬃx to the list con-
tent, the greater its disruptive eﬀect; for example changing the
voice between sequence and suﬃx, changing the location, inten-
sity, timbre and so on, all lead to a decrease in the suﬃx eﬀect
(e.g., Crowder and Morton, 1969; Nairne, 1990; Surprenant et al.,
2000). Here again, degradation of representations of the tar-
get items by the irrelevant suﬃx appears to be implicated as
the mechanism of disruption. However, it turns out not to be
the case. Applying the type of consideration of auditory object
formation discussed above, Nicholls and Jones (2002). See also
Maidment and Macken, 2012; Maidment et al., 2013) compared
the eﬀect on serial recall of a suﬃx presented on its own, at
the end of a to-be-remembered sequence with one presented in
the presence of a ‘captor’ sequence running simultaneously with
the to-be-remembered sequence of auditory digits. In both types
of condition a suﬃx (the spoken word ‘go’) was presented after
the ﬁnal digit, so according to the item interference account, it
should degrade the representation of the ﬁnal sequence items.
However, while the typical disruption to performance occurred
under standard conditions, the addition of a captor sequence –
repetitions of the word ‘go’ – throughout sequence presentation
restored performance, and did so to the extent that the captor
sequence formed a coherent perceptual object into which the
suﬃx would be captured. The ability to recall the target infor-
mation, therefore, is not impeded in the presence of the suﬃx
due to degradation of its representation in limited capacity short-
term storage, but rather due to the eﬀect the suﬃx has, in being
bound with the target sequence, of reducing the addressability of
information within the sequence, just as illustrated in the exam-
ples depicted in Figures 4 and 5 above. When the suﬃx, despite
occupying the same temporal and acoustic relation to the tar-
get material is captured and bound into an object other than
the target sequence, then its impact on recall of that sequence is
accordingly eliminated.
Conclusion
Across these diverse settings we see a picture of performance
that is not easily captured by an approach that presumes
the functional units correspond to ‘items’ – be they tones
or speech sounds, relevant or otherwise – and the form of
interactions – storage, decay, interference, etc. – amongst these
items in limited capacity systems. Rather, performance reﬂects
a much more dynamic set of processes that are implicated in
the formation into objects of the whole task environment, the
utilization and transformation of those objects, as a function
of the nature of the material and the repertoire of the partic-
ipant, in order to accomplish the particular requirements of a
given task. We have described a wide variety of settings in which
manipulations, from the classical view of limited capacity short-
term memory, would appear subtle or mere matters of input to
and output from the limited capacity central system, but which
from our dynamic object- oriented approach can be seen as the
determinants, in combination, of performance.
Importantly, therefore, since they play no explanatory role,
there is no requirement within such a framework to determine
what the putative static, discrete itemsmight be in terms of which
the limits to performance might be quantiﬁed – all the explana-
tory concepts are orthogonal to such concerns. In this way, the
reciprocal question of capacity and how it might be expressed
or to what it might relate disappears. Further, the approach we
have outlined here connotes a diﬀerent conception of limited
performance to that resident within 60 years of cognitive psy-
chology. The analysis of the history and conceptual origins of
the cognitive approach with which we began, implicates aspects
of a particular Zeitgeist in the early conﬂation of limited per-
formance with limited capacity of the systems underpinning
performance. The approach we have outlined here attributes the
limited performance which has constituted the focus of so much
investigation not to the limited capacity of any system or sys-
tems, but rather (we might say, ‘simply’) to the fact that the
settings in which such performance has been investigated have,
by design, reduced the conﬂuence between the repertoire of the
participant, the task she or he is required to accomplish, and
the material that forms the focus of that task. In place, then, of
capacity and its concomitants, we propose performance limita-
tions be examined by detailed focus on the dynamic interplay of
multiple aspects of the task setting. Undoubtedly, these involve
aspects of the perceptual-motor systems co-opted to perform a
given task. But in themselves these are not determinant, since
other aspects of the setting such as the precise requirements of
the task, will determine when, what, and if such aspects of the
participants’ repertoire impact on performance. This means that
there are, in principle, no structural limitations on performance;
the more congruent the conﬂuence of the aspects of the setting –
the task material, the task requirements and the repertoire of the
participant – the better performance will be. The examples we
have described here show that such a framework accounts for the
modulation of performance in a detailed and dynamic way, as a
function of the congruence of multiple aspects of the setting; to
the extent that the degree of such congruence is unlimited, then
so too is performance.
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